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I. PREFACE: A UTOPIAN SCENARIO FOR PORTABLE HEALTHCARE
I was on my dream vacation in remote beautiful rural Alaska. As luck would
have it, I had barely had time settle into my hotel room in Anchorage for the
afternoon when the chills and high fever started. It rang bells from a distant semester
in college and a rather nasty bout of pneumonia. My primary care physician
(“PCP”), like me, had decided to take some of her precious time off and go off
hiking to Lake Moshannon State Park in rural Pennsylvania; hopes of reaching her
were bleak.
It was 4:00 in the afternoon. With my chills under the dubious control of overthe-counter Naproxen, I bravely walked into to a local library with free Internet
access for patrons. With practiced ease, I signed on to a terminal and typed in the
universal resource locator (“URL”) for the patient portal of my hospital in Cleveland,
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Ohio – The MetroHealth System (“MHS”).1 This portal would allow me to view the
relevant parts of my medical record, contact the physician who was handling my
PCP’s cases in her absence, request an acute care referral to the University of Alaska
Medical Center (“UAMC”) in Anchorage, with pre-authorization from my insurance
company.2 I signed on to the portal with my name and was immediately prompted to
place my thumb on an optical fingerprint scanner attached to the terminal. An image
of my thumbprint showed up on the screen - the system had legally validated that it
was indeed me.
The site then transmitted a Secure Sockets Layer/User
Authentication (“SSL/UA”) digital certificate to my terminal, which would be my
passport to use the system for the rest of the session until I signed out.3 Finding the
supporting physician was easy enough – she was my allergist. I could tell that she
was also online. I wrote a brief message giving her the specifics of my symptoms
along with my federally mandated electronic signature on the request, which she
acknowledged.4 I returned to my hotel.
While I waited, the machinery of a thoroughly modern, national electronic
healthcare information infrastructure was set in motion. The physician had been
connected to MetroHealth from her home in Mentor, Ohio, via MetroHealth’s secure
remote access services. With an optical fingerprint attachment on her laptop, she
provided her electronic authentication; she then electronically signed a referral to the
Acute Care division at UAMC with a request for an appointment on my behalf. The
system of course was smarter. Before dispatching the referral, it retrieved my list of
insurance carriers. First, it performed a live eligibility verification query with
Medical Mutual of Ohio (“MMO”), my health insurance carrier, to ensure that my
coverage extended to out-of-state acute care services. To do this, the system used an
ANSI X12 v4010 (“X12”) 270 Eligibility Inquiry transaction mandated by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).5 After verification,
MMO’s records system responded with a return X12 271 Eligibility Response
transaction. The MHS system then submitted the entire referral to MMO for preauthorization using the X12 278 Health Services Review transaction also mandated
by HIPAA.6 The insurance counselor who opened the referral request at her terminal
in Columbus, Ohio, used a two-factor authentication system to electronically sign her
1

Copyright © 2004 The MetroHealth System, 2500 MetroHealth Drive, Cleveland, Ohio
44109-1998.
2
For an example of a typical patient portal solution, see Shared Medical Record for
Patients, at ¶2 (Copyright © 2004 Epic Systems Corporation), at http://www.epicsystems.
com/software/mychart.htm, [hereinafter Patient Portal] (describing similar features available
in Epic’s MyChart© patient portal software).
3

See infra section V.D.

4

See Patient Portal, supra note 2. See also infra section VII.A.

5

For HIPAA see Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936 (1996). For the specific regulations
regarding standard transactions and code sets, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162 (2002). ANSI is the
American National Standards Institute located at http://www.ansi.org.
Technical
implementation documentation on all ANSI X12 transactions under HIPAA are available
through the Washington Publishing Company, at http://www.wpc-edi.com/.
6

Id.
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approval of the referral.7 MMO then transmitted a completed and approved X12 278
transaction including the pre-authorization data, and all the electronic signatures to
UAMC, and an acknowledging copy to MHS. All transactions occurred through
encrypted connection tunnels over the public internet, secured in accordance with the
Security provisions of HIPAA (“HIPAA Security Rule”).8 Ten minutes later a care
management specialist at UAMC was reviewing the request and setting up an
appointment for my visit.
Approximately an hour after I returned to my hotel room from the library, the
phone rang - the concierge informed me that that a UAMC Acute Care transport
would be arriving to pick me up at 6:30 PM. By 7:15 PM, I was at UAMC being
interviewed by a Patient Services Representative (“PSR”). On the screen in front of
her she had an open electronic consent form which she asked me to read. She also
handed me a copy of the UAMC Notice of Privacy Practices (“NPP”).9 I was
instructed to click a checkbox next to each item on the form if I agreed with the
provision. At the end of the last screen of the three-screen form I verified my
personal information, and placed my signature using a digital signature capture
device. The picture of my signature appeared on the screen, but the system had also
collected and stored handwriting metrics unique to me, thereby authenticating me as
the true signatory.10 I had thus signed my acknowledgment of the NPP, my consent
to being treated, and my general consent to the release of relevant care information to
MMO for billing and claims purposes. The electronically signed claims and care
details would be later transmitted by UAMC to MMO using the X12 837 Healthcare
Claim and X12 275 Additional Information Request and Response with Attachments
transactions mandate by HIPAA.11
Because I had a suspected infectious condition, the attending physician wanted
me to stay under observation overnight. With two clicks of his mouse, a Notice of
Admission was sent to MMO using another X12 278 transaction which was
acknowledged using an X12 997 transaction.12 Twenty five minutes later I was in an
observation bed, the first dose of antibiotic administered, turning the pages of
Patricia Cornwell’s Blow Fly.13 Outside it had started to snow.
II. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare, like many industries, is fast embracing the benefits of modern
information technology (“IT”).14 The wide range of available publications on the use

7

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75(B)(2) (Anderson 2002).

8

45 C.F.R. § 162.312 (2002).

9

§ 164.520.

10

See infra , note 236, section IX.A.

11

45 C.F.R. § 162.1101 et. seq.

12

Id.

13

PATRICIA CORNWELL, BLOW FLY (Putnam Pub. Group) (2003).

14

A Gartner report indicates that “the U.S. healthcare IT market is forecast to grow at a
compound annual growth rate of 7.0 percent from $34.1 billion in 2001 to $47.9 billion in
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of IT in healthcare indicates that IT provides the promise of faster and more
comprehensive information about all aspects of the healthcare delivery process, to all
classes of its consumers – patients, doctors, nurses, insurance adjudicators, health
inspectors, epidemiologists, and biostatisticians.15 But the drive towards electronic
information in healthcare is not rooted merely in efficiency; more recently,
significant emphasis has been placed on patient safety issues raised by the Institute
of Medicine’s (“IOM”) year 2001 quality report on the subject.16 It is believed that
the deficiencies indicated in that report can be substantially overcome by the use of
IT in healthcare.17 However, to make this transition successful and complete, all
aspects of healthcare delivery, information management, and business transactions,
have to be logically migrated into the electronic world. This includes the function
and use of the signature.18
The use of signatures in business contexts has traditionally provided two
functions of legal significance: 1) evidence that can attribute documents to a
particular party, and 2) indication of assent and intent that the documents have legal
effect.19 In the recent decades, state and federal statutes have substantiated these
functional attributes to digital or electronic signatures.20 Many of these statutes
derive from model codes, such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(“UETA”), that attempt to standardize use and technology surrounding electronic

2006.” Geraldine Cruz, In Unforgiving Times, the U.S. Healthcare Market Boosts IT
Spending, 2001-2006, HEALTHCARE DATA & STATISTICS, Gartner, Inc. (2003).
15

For instance, a search on the phrase ‘information technology’ at BioMed Central yields
publications that pertain to most of these areas. BioMed Central is an open access publisher
located at http://www.biomedcentral.com. See also the focus areas and reports at Gartner’s
Healthcare website located at http://www4.gartner.com/research/focus_areas/asset_48261.jsp.
16

Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st
Century, National Academy Press (2001). The study stated that "[i]ndeed, between the health
care that we now have, and the health care we could have, lies not just a gap, but a chasm.”
17

David W. Bates, The Quality Case for Information Technology in Healthcare, BMC
MED. INFORMATICS AND DECISION MAKING, 2:7, BioMed Central, Inc. (2002), available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/7. In the Discussion section the author notes that
although many healthcare provider organizations use IT, they are yet to realize the efficiencies
of similar use in other industries such as airline and parcel services. Furthermore, healthcare
has invested at least “50% less of its gross revenues in information technology than other
information-intensive industries like banking.”
18
James A Menke et al, Computerized Clinical Documentation System in the Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit, BMC MED. INFORMATICS AND DECISION MAKING, 1:3, BioMed Central,
Inc. (2001), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/1/3.
19

Peter Brown, The Validity Of Click-Wrap Agreements, 765 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 111, 135
(2003).
20
See, e.g., Electronic Signature Systems, OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3701.75 (West 2004).
See also Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001(1),
7001(2) (West 2004), [hereinafter Federal E-Sign Law]. These laws are discussed in greater
detail in infra Section V. For the rest of the discussion, digital signature and electronic
signature are assumed to have the same meaning and used interchangeably.
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signatures.21 Subsequent sections will attempt to identify gaps in the standards
which prevent true transaction portability. Lack of portability defeats one of the
fundamental goals of healthcare IT solutions – improved efficiency. The discussion
will end with a proposal for a uniform federal statutory scheme for standardized
electronic signatures for healthcare.
A. The Functions of Signature in the Healthcare Context
As in all business practices, in healthcare too, a physical signature provides
evidence of the signatory’s identity, intent, and consent.22 At common law,
signatures are used in consents and authorizations,23 orders and acknowledgments,24
and receipts and validations.25 The existence of this body of law strongly indicates
that at least in healthcare, written signatures have significant importance in the care
delivery process. Hence, as the healthcare industry moves to the electronic
information age, some thought is necessary to create reliable equivalent processes
that maintain the functionality of the individual signature.26
B. Signature Functions at Common Law: Some Modern Case Examples
In Biddle v. Warren General Hosp., the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with
the issue of patient consents with regards to disclosure of non-public health
information to third parties.27 The court held that “in Ohio, an independent tort
exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic
medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physicianpatient relationship.”28 Similarly, in Berger v. Sonneland the Washington Supreme
Court reaffirmed its recognition of an independent cause of action for the breach of

21

See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, Drafted by the National Conference Of
Commissioners On Uniform State Laws (1999), at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/uecicta/eta1299.htm. It is of some interest that UETA and Federal E-Sign Law are
substantially similar, although the latter has evolved around modern concepts of electronic
identity management. The associated technology and the inconsistencies of standards are
further discussed in infra Section V.
22

See Christopher Reed, Legally Binding Electronic Documents: Digital Signatures And
Authentication, 35 INT’L LAW. 89, 93 (2001).
23
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1991) (informed
consent required prior to taking tissue samples from patient); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp.,
715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999) (disclosure to a third party without consent is a recognized tort).
24

See Ruefle v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2003 WL 22442063 at *1 (Pa. Sep. 04, 2003)
(physician FMLA certification form requires physician’s signature).
25
See Sharp v. Lewis Ford, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (form
acknowledging change of physicians in a Workers’ Compensation claim requires signature).
26

See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, 96-99 (Wiley Computer Publishing)
(2000).
27

See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518.

28

Id. at 523
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the physician patient confidentiality under Washington law.29 Of course, underlying
both Biddle and Berger, is the traditional concept of patient consent documented
with a written signature on paper.30 The typical signed document is usually kept with
the patient’s paper medical record in a hospital’s medical records department.31
The common law requirement of the written device has usually resulted in state
policy. Hence, in Garrett v. Young, a California Court of Appeals refused to find a
cause of action against the healthcare provider for disclosure of health information to
her employer because the patient had not provided a written request prohibiting such
disclosure in accordance with California statutes.32 Garrett is a modern illustration
of the continued reliance on the requirement of a signed document in healthcare
delivery agreements.33
C. Statutory Basis For Signatures In Modern Healthcare
The law’s tradition of written and signed agreements between patients and
healthcare providers is not the only source for its statutory renditions. Various
business aspects of healthcare reflect the traditional use of signatures as evidenced in
a variety of statutes.34 Indeed, the decisions cited here are also illustrative of state
statutes in appropriate jurisdictions.35 However, these cases and statutes demonstrate

29
Berger v. Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257, 267 (Wash. 2001). Specifically, the court found that
petitioner Sonneland's conduct constituted "health care" under Washington statute because he
had disclosed the confidential information “in his effort to discover more information about
Respondent's use of pain medications so he could treat, diagnose, or care for [the patient].”
30

See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518; Berger, 26 P.3d at 265.

31

See, e.g., CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
Functions of the Health Information Management Department, at http://centralstatehospital.
org/Himd2.htm.
32

Garrett v. Young, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 134, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The court denied the
cause of action in spite of the evidence that the patient had orally requested nondisclosure.
The court specifically stated its obligation “to interpret the statute in accordance with its plain
language and the intent of the Legislature.” It went on to hold that because the notice had
been oral it did not comply with the statutory prerequisite of a written notice to nondisclosure.
33

Id.

34

See, e.g., Parental Consent To Performing Abortion Upon Minor, ALA. CODE § 26-21-3
(2004); Injection card system; protocols, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4065 (West 2002);
Notice of lack of malpractice insurance, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.143 (West 2004).
35
In Berger, 26 P.3d at 265-66, the Washington Supreme Court substantially relied on
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.030(3) (West 2004), which requires the plaintiff to establish
that “injury resulted from health care to which the patient or his representative did not
consent.” (emphasis added). In contrast, see Garrett, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 142, relies on CAL.
CIV. CODE § 56.16 (West 2004) whereby a “specific written request by the patient” is required
to prohibit disclosures to unintended parties. In Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525, the Ohio Supreme
Court faced the problem of Legislative silence in distinguishing between the patient-provider
and attorney-client relationships. The court placed emphasis on the latter and refused to
accept defendant’s attempt to use OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.021 (West 2004) to establish
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a lack of consistency in the structure, approach, and resolution of signature related
issues in a ubiquitous transactional element of the healthcare delivery process –
patient consent.
More recently, federal health privacy and security regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) under HIPAA represent a
national attempt to establish baseline standards for these types of agreements
between patients and providers.36 The requirements for written signatures indicating
agreement persist even under these rules.37 The combination of written signature
requirements with statutes that give legal effect to electronic signatures, is at the
foundation of modern electronic transactions.38 In Medical Self Care, Inc. ex rel.
Development Specialists, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York faced the issue of whether an e-mail
should be “considered a writing for the purposes of enforcing a ‘written consent’
clause of a contract.”39 The court, interpreting federal regulations under the
Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce (“Federal E-Sign Law”)
law, held that it should be.40 It is thus relevant to consider the implications of
electronic transactions in healthcare functions that otherwise require written
signatures.
III. HEALTHCARE IN THE ELECTRONIC INFORMATION AGE
In 1991, the Health Information Management Systems Society’s (HIMSS)
Committee on Improving the Patient Record, convened by the Institute of Medicine,
set a goal to make the computerized patient record a standard technology in
healthcare by 2001.41 In a recent article, Joyce Sensmeier, Director of Professional
Services for HIMSS, wrote of a “growing consensus that clinical information
systems will provide the bridge to advancing the integration of information systems
in healthcare.”42 Sensmeier concluded that “enabling access to relevant patient
information from multiple settings and encounters at the point of care will have a
significant positive impact on the quality, consistency, and timeliness of data and

that the hospital’s attorney firm was not a third party; the patients’ indicated written consents
therefore did not extend to disclosure to the attorney firm.
36

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.

37

Id.

38

See, e.g., Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1306.06 (West
2004).
39

Medical Self Care, Inc. ex rel. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. NBC Co., Inc., 2003 WL
1622181 at *6, (S.D.N.Y., Mar 28, 2003).
40

Id. (citing Federal E-Sign Law, §§ 7001(1), 7001(2)).

41

Institute of Medicine, The Computer-based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for
Healthcare, R. S. Dick and E. B. Steen, eds. National Academy Press (1991).
42
Joyce Sensemeier, Advancing the State of Data Integration in Healthcare, 17 J.
HEALTHCARE INFO. MGMT. 4, 58 (2003), available at http://www.himss.org/content/
files/jhim/17-4/sensmeier.pdf.
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information.”43 This general trend of increasing reliance on electronic information in
healthcare is reflected in cases that have begun to emerge in the lower courts
involving direct healthcare delivery.44 Similar issues have also emerged in allied
healthcare related businesses.45
A. Migrating Healthcare Information Management From Paper
to Electronic Records
The first suggestions of benefits of the use of electronic records in healthcare
trace back to the work of Tang.46 Recent efforts to foster migration of the paper
health record to electronic form have focused on “how the physicians work, and
develop the software with an eye toward solving real problems.”47 In the opinion of
some physicians, electronic documentation requirements for healthcare records in the
United States are more complex and “a coordinated national effort to identify the
required components of an [electronic medical record system]”48 is necessary.
In 1997, in a statement before the United States National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics (“NCVHS”), the Chair of the Association For Electronic Health
Care Transactions (“AFEHCT”) emphasized the need for national standardization for
healthcare transactions.49 The statement was made in support of the proposed
HIPAA Administrative Simplification legislation.50 It characterized the legislation

43

Id. at 61.

44

See, e.g., Schmidt v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 218 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Wis. 2003)
(putative class action against the Veterans Administration by employees alleging that the VA
violated the employees’ rights under the Privacy Act by disclosing their Social Security
numbers (SSNs) on VA computer system to employees who had no need for the SSNs);
Detroit Medical Center v. Provider Healthnet Services, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 487, (D. Del.
2003) (breach of contract action against health information management company seeking
rescission of asset agreement and service agreement).
45

See Martello v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., 795 A.2d 185 (Md. 2002)
(sole proprietor of medical claims clearinghouse that furnished electronic connectivity services
brought anti-trust action against larger electronic connectivity provider and insurer that sold
provider its electronic connectivity business).
46

P.C. Tang et al., Traditional Medical Records As A Source Of Clinical Data In The
Outpatient Setting, PROC. ANN. SYMP. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN MED. CARE 575 (1994).
47
Jacob Reider, The Electronic Medical Record: Promises and Pitfalls, MEDSCAPE GEN.
MED. 5(3), at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/460247.
48

Id.

49

Benjamin Curtis, Statement Before The National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics (NCVHS), Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards, and Security (1997),
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/970210t5.htm. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k), the
NCVHS serves as the statutory public advisory body to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services in the area of health data and statistics. NCVHS is located at http://www.ncvhs.gov.
50
Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA consists of sections 261 through 264. § 262 amends Title
XI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq., to add a Part C, entitled
“Administrative Simplification,” with sections 1171-1179, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d
through § 1320(d)-8 (West Supp. 2002). Section 261 is a note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(d) and
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as “an opportunity for the development and use of a uniform implementation process
of the standards intended for transmitting and receiving electronic data [and] the
increased availability [and] use of electronic health care transactions.”51 Realization
of these opportunities depends on a standardized electronic signature.52
B. Making the Signature an Electronic Process
To realize the opportunity of standardization for electronic signatures, it is useful
to revisit the example on consent.53 Peter Brensilver writes that there are significant
potential benefits of using interactive electronic methodologies in the expression of
consent.54 Regulatory frameworks have been proposed for electronic informed
consents.55 However, these proposals mention, but do not successfully address, the
complexity of the one device that embodies such consent – the electronic signature.56
Brensilver states that although the “[Federal E-sign Law] further exemplifies the
acceptance of technology in setting legal standards,”57 to stay within the scope of
congress’s constitutional authority, the law applies to interstate or foreign
transactions only. Efforts to legislate standards for electronic signatures at the state
level have followed the general guidelines for the Federal E-Sign Law.58 However,
the approaches have varied significantly enough to make the electronic equivalent of
the written device less than fully portable.59 As seen in subsequent sections, owing
to the complexity of methods of electronic identity validation of the signatory, even
subtle variations in implementation methodologies, while legally indistinguishable in
their respective jurisdictions, nevertheless, can render the signature non-portable
across state borders or even systems within a state.

Section 264 is a note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(d)-(2). Also, Section 263 amends the Public
Health Service Act, at 42 U.S.C.A. § 242k(k) (West Supp.2002).
51

Curtis, supra note 49.

52

See generally Christian James Helbling, Electronic Records and Signatures in
Healthcare and the Interplay of E-Sign, HIPAA and UETA, Buchanan Ingersoll (2001), at
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00323/000777/title/subject/topic/consumer%20law_c
onsumer%20protection/filename/consumerlaw_1_392.
53

See supra Section II.

54

See Peter Brensilver, Note, E-Formed Consent: Evaluating the Interplay of Interactive
Technology and Informed Consent, 70 GEO WASH. L. REV. 613, 623 (2002).
55

Id. at 630.

56

Id. at 622.

57

Id. at 623.

58

15 U.S.C. §§ 7001(1), 7001(2).

59

See Brensilver, supra note 54, at 630 (citing, as example, two state statutes regarding
electronic signatures). But, whereas, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2145(B) (West 2000) tasks
the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to develop guidelines for permissibility and
security requirements such as “the use of codes, fingerprints, or other identifying methods,”
the functionally similar OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3701.75(B)(2) stipulates that the signatory of
the signature must be verified by a “biometric” or “two-level” authentication scheme.
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IV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
The goal of this discussion is to propose a uniform electronic signature standard
through federal law. We often take for granted this portability as it pertains to a
written signature. Seldom do we question whether a signature made on an
instrument of financial transaction executed in Ohio will remain a valid instrument
after it is mailed to the state of Louisiana. For electronic signatures, the core of this
challenge is the portability of the signature. Portability of a signature is indeed a
three-fold feature. First, from a forensic standpoint, a written signature is a
biometric element that uniquely identifies its signatory through handwriting.60
Second, and as a result, its authenticity and its integrity are independently verifiable
by handwriting experts for the purpose of legal review.61 The two features –
authentication of the signatory and integrity of the instrument – together guarantee
that the transaction validated by a signature will be non-repudiable in a legal
dispute.62 They also establish the intent and consent of the signatory with respect to
the transaction.
A. Recent Historical Perspective On The Problem: The Schnorr Patent
The use of an electronic medium to replace a written signature poses the
immediate problem of maintaining the integrity of the written device because no
longer is the signatory’s biometric information inherent in the device. Dr. Claus P.
Schnorr, a resident of Frankfurt, Germany, owns the patent for a "Method for
Identifying Subscribers and for Generating and Verifying Electronic Signatures in a
Data Exchange System."63 The patent applies to a method for mutual identification
of subscribers who are participating in an encrypted data exchange system.64 The
Schnorr patent demonstrates one problem with the transition of the signature to an
electronic medium. Whereas the biometric element of the written signature is a
human physical characteristic, its technological equivalent here is represented in
patented intellectual property that is not freely accessible to others!65
The proprietary aspect of Schnorr’s scheme was the subject of dispute in Cylink
Corp. v. Schnorr which upheld Schnorr’s rights to the patented algorithm.66 Dr.
Schnorr licensed his patent to Public Key Partnership ("PKP"), a partnership formed
by Caro-Kann, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cylink, and RSA Data Security, Inc.
(“RSA”).67 Although PKP was eventually dissolved and its license agreement with
60
Alan E. Brill, The Technologies Of Privacy And Privacy Invasion: An Introduction, 748
PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 85, 109 (2003).
61
See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that “handwriting
comparison testimony has a long history of admissibility in the courts of this country”).
62

See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
63

U.S. Patent No. 4,995,082 (issued Feb. 19, 1991).

64

Id.

65

See Brill, supra note 60.

66

Cylink Corp. v. Schnorr, 939 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.D.C. 1996).

67

Id.at 40.
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Dr. Schnorr terminated, during the months prior to the dissolution, Cylink and RSA
competed for an exclusive licensing agreement with Dr. Schnorr, in which RSA
prevailed and was appointed as the exclusive representative to license and enforce
the Schnorr patent.68 Following an RSA press-release Cylink's in-house counsel
proposed that Cylink would represent Dr. Schnorr's patent better than RSA but was
informed that the agreement with RSA was exclusive and that RSA would enforce
the patent.69 It was suggested that Cylink apply to RSA to obtain a license for the
Schnorr patent.70 Instead, Cylink filed a petition for a judgment declaring that its use
of a particular digital signature algorithm did not infringe the patent.71 Eventually
Schnorr’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted thereby upholding his patent
rights.72
The impact of the Cylink decision has rippled through the IT community. It has
even thwarted the federal government’s efforts at creating electronic signatory
authentication standards under the Federal Information Processing Standard
(“FIPS”).73 The FIPS 186 Digital Signature Standard (“DSS”), was issued in May
1994, under which the Digital Signature Algorithm (“DSA”) proposed a standard for
authentication, including integrity.74 However, prior to the adoption of the standard,
the U.S. government filed a patent application on DSA in an attempt to exercise
exclusive control on the standard and its evolution, avoid variants in the industry,
and subsequently license the patent to future implementers of DSA, thereby
strengthening the standard itself.75 The move was successfully opposed by Schnorr
who claimed that DSA could not be practiced without infringing his digital signature
patent.76 While the Federal government has continued to make efforts at creating a
standard, there has not been any significant legislative backing for implementation of
such standards, and even less so in electronic healthcare.77

68

Id.

69

Id. of 41

70

Id.

71

Id. Cylink was subsequently invited by RSA to either enter negotiations for a license to
the Schnorr Patent or cease marketing and selling products that incorporated Schnorr’s
algorithm.
72

Id. at 42.

73

See Edward J. Radlo, Legal Issues In Cryptography, 13 NO. 5 COMPUTER LAW. 1,
(1996). In reviewing the evolution of cryptography in digital signatures, the author outlines
efforts under FIPS that were challenged by Schnorr. FIPS publications can be found at
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/.
74

Id. at 11

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. See also HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.304, which uses a very non-specific
definition of authentication as “the corroboration that a person is the one claimed.”
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B. Avoiding Risks Associated With Electronic Data: Encryption and Access Control
Aside from portability there remains a continuing need for a standard similar to
the FIPS proposals, because the lack of standards introduces significant security risks
in electronic data exchange.78 In practice, this means that signature and transaction
data needs protection from improper visibility and unauthorized access. The
vulnerability of unprotected data is highlighted in Cobell v. Norton.79 In the April
2001 issue of The Government Executive magazine, Dominic Nessi, the Chief
Information Officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") observed that BIA had
“no security . . . [and] no infrastructure…[and the] entire network . . . [could] be
breached by a high school kid.”80 The plaintiffs had already sought a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) aimed at preventing destruction of Indian trust funds and
records, which had been granted.81
Following Nessi’s declaration, Cobell and others brought a second suit against
the Secretary of the Department of Interior (“DOI”), seeking among other things, an
emergency temporary restraining order to prevent further destruction of data in
BIA’s systems in violation of the first TRO.82 A court assigned Special Master
began an investigation of the DOI’s IT systems and produced a report.83 The report
highlighted that the DOI had breached its duty to ensure the integrity of the data in
its care, and had failed to comply with several federal regulations.84 Furthermore, its
failure was evident in the “enormity of the dangers to which this trust information
[was] being exposed.”85
Cobell’s issues are applicable to healthcare information and transactions.
Elements of electronic signatures such as the signature code, signatory’s identity,
tokens, and so on, are all pieces of electronic information that are necessarily stored
somewhere. If they are openly visible or otherwise retrievable without the
signatory’s permission or knowledge, then the very identity of the signatory as well
78

See Radlo, supra note 73.

79

Cobell v. Norton, 2001 WL 1555296, D.D.C. (Dec 6, 2001).

80

Id. at *1 (citing Katherine McIntire Peters, Trail of Troubles, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE,
April 1, 2001 at 100).
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id. at *6 (citing The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (making
uniform federal information resources management policies and practices as a means to
improve the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of government programs); The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (criminalizing
unauthorized access to electronic communications); The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (criminalizing unauthorized access to information stored on
government computer systems); The Computer Security Act of 1987 40 U.S.C. § 1441
(requiring the government to promulgate standards for computer security, train relevant
employees in computer security and establish plans for the security and privacy of computer
information)).
85

Id. at *6.
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as the signature’s integrity may be compromised. It is therefore necessary to both
secure as well as validate electronic signatures and transaction contents. Technology
has answered this challenge with cryptographic techniques of hiding information
content, commonly referred to as encryption, which renders data unintelligible by
altering it in an ordered fashion.86 In the healthcare context, the federal government
has attempted to respond to such technology by prescribing encryption requirements
for healthcare under the HIPAA Security Rule.87
The preamble to the rules, in pertinent part, acknowledges the “financial and
technical burdens associated with the employment of encryption tools” in the context
of “small and rural providers.”88 This degree of hesitance and flexibility in the rule
is reflective of the unsettled nature of the law in a rapidly evolving technical field.
Arguably, although encryption is an addressable standard, the addressability may be
narrowed based on a healthcare facility’s size, location, accessibility to resources,
and so on.89 Additionally, the preamble encourages “[healthcare facilities] . . . to
consider use of encryption technology for transmitting electronic protected health
information, particularly over the internet.”90 Understanding the interplay between
electronic signatures as electronic data, and the integrity and security of the
transactions they bind to, requires a scrutiny of the interaction of current signature
technology, the law, and federal and state technology policy.
V. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE TECHNOLOGY, CURRENT LAW, AND POLICY
A. Legal Requirements for Electronic Signatures
Any proposed generalized electronic signature scheme should address three
principle aspects of the signature - its structure, its signatory, and the integrity of the
transaction it binds to.91 Laws and governmental publications in the past decade lend
clues as to the specifications of each of these aspects and we start there.
The structure of the signature is typically found in the definitions of the
electronic signature itself. For instance, the Federal E-Sign Law defines electronic
signature as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically
86

Cryptography and encryption are discussed further in supra section V.B.

87

See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (requiring a covered entity to “[i]mplement a
mechanism to encrypt electronic protected health information whenever deemed
appropriate.”); See also § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (addressable implementation of “a mechanism to
encrypt and decrypt electronic protected health information.”). “[A]ddressable” and
“required” specifications are explained at § 164.306(d)(1).
88

See 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8357 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, and

164).
89
Id. at 8336 (discussing “addressable” standards as those where a covered entity “will
ultimately do one of the following: (a) Implement one or more of the addressable
implementation specifications; (b) implement one or more alternative security measures; (c)
implement a combination of both; or (d) not implement either an addressable implementation
specification or an alternative security measure.”)
90

Id. at 8357.

91

See 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000).

2003-04]

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN E-HEALTHCARE

109

associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with
the intent to sign the record.”92 The UETA adopts the identical definition.93
In contrast, the Ohio Electronic Signature Systems statute for healthcare defines
the electronic signature as:
[A]ny of the following attached to or associated with an electronic record
by an individual to authenticate the record:
(a) A code consisting of a combination of letters, numbers, characters, or
symbols that is adopted or executed by an individual as that individual's
electronic signature;
(b) A computer-generated signature code created for an individual;
(c) An electronic image of an individual's handwritten signature created
by using a pen computer.94
Finally, the proposed electronic signature rule under HIPAA (“proposed HIPAA
rule”) takes a broad and generalized approach.95 It specifies, in relevant part, that
“[a]n electronic signature is the attribute affixed to an electronic document to bind it
to a particular entity.”96
Intuitively, integrity of a signature applies to both the content of a transaction as
also to the signatory’s consent and intent with respect to that content as she
understands it to be at the time of the signing. Abstract expression of consent and
intent is inherently difficult to capture in electronic form. Hence, in situations where
the law would require a signature in writing, a consumer’s understanding and
consent must be assured when asked to use an electronic signature instead.97 In this
regard, the Federal E-Sign Law goes farthest by stipulating various assurances that
need to be provided to the consumer prior to the expression of their assent to the
transaction, when an electronic signature is used for a transaction that would
otherwise require a written signature.98 In contrast, the Ohio signature law requires
only that there be “a process to verify that the individual affixing the electronic
signature has reviewed the contents of the entry and determined that the entry
92

§ 7006(5).

93

Uniform Electronic Transaction Act § 2(8).

94

See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3701.75(A)(2) (West 2004).

95

See Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241, 43269 (Oct. 12,
1998) (proposed rule to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 142).
96

Id.

97

See Radlo, supra note 73, at 1.

98

15 U.S.C.A § 7001(C) specifies a gamut of protected consumer rights. Specifically,
§ 7001(C)(1) outlines those specific rights that must be guaranteed for an electronic signature
to satisfy the requirement of a written signature including intent of the signatory as well has
her understanding of the process and the implications of the electronic signature and
transaction.
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contains what that individual intended.”99 The proposed HIPAA rule requires that
there be a “logical manifestation of signature” and that there exist “additional
information such as time stamp and signature purpose specific to that user.”100
While the structure of the signature may be statutorily defined and the intent of
the signatory embedded in appropriate language contained in the transaction itself,
defining and authenticating the signatory’s electronic identity poses a significant
technological challenge.101 Approaches to authentication of the signatory’s identity
can vary. The proposed HIPAA rule integrates a general authentication requirement
of the signatory’s identity into the structure by adding to the definition that the
signature must “[secure] the user authentication (proof of claimed identity) at the
time the signature is generated.”102 The Ohio statute in contrast is highly specific
with respect to the technology to be used for authenticating the signatory by
requiring that an electronic signature system utilize “either a two-level access control
mechanism that assigns a unique identifier to each user or a biometric access control
device.”103 Other state statutes take varying approaches.104
It should be also noted that identity, authentication, and consent and intent are
meaningful only to the extent that their integrity and security are maintained
throughout the entire transaction. This might include electronic transmission of the
content and the signature. In healthcare, existing privacy and security requirements
pertaining to Protected Health Information (“PHI”) therefore apply to all
transactional content.105 They would also apply for the entirety of the transmission
of such content.106 The unification of these concepts into the electronic signature
structure is at the core of the electronic signature and we turn to it next.
B. Analyzing Portability: Identification, Authentication and Intent - Cryptography
and Public Key Encryption
The proposed HIPAA signature rule emphasizes that the signature should
“[ensure] the integrity of the signed document to enable transportability of data,
interoperability, independent verifiability, and continuity of signature capability.”107
The simplicity of this statutory requirement belies the enormous complexity of the
science necessary to address it – cryptography.108

99

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3701.75(B)(4).

100

63 Fed. Reg. at 43,273.

101

See generally SCHNEIER, supra note 26.
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Id.
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See § 3701.75(B)(2).
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See statutes listed in infra section VI.A and notes therein.
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See 45 C.F.R. §164.501
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See 63 Fed. Reg. at 43, 265-69.

107

Id. at 43, 274.
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For an exhaustive review, see SCHNEIER, supra note 26.
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Traditional cryptography is a three-step process. First, plaintext transactional
content is encoded using: (a) a general mathematical scheme (also known as an
algorithm), and (b) a signatory-specific key (also known as a cipher).109 The
unintelligible, encoded data content (also known as ciphertext) can be deciphered
only by the key-holder; as long as the cipher is sufficiently robust, and the signatory
and recipients are the sole proprietors of the keys, the integrity of the transaction is
assured.110 Next, a message authentication code (“MAC”), mathematically derived
from attributes of the original message content, is added to the encrypted
transaction.111 The MAC ensures that “the [transaction] came from the person it
purports to have come from (authentication), and that the [content] was not altered in
transit (integrity).”112 The last step is to add the digital signature, which itself is a
code that is computed from: (a) the encrypted message, and (b) unique information
in a signatory’s key. 113 The digital signature is then attached to the encrypted
transaction to indicate both authorship as well as consent.114
To ensure proper functionality, modern digital cryptography uses the Public Key
Encryption (“PKE”) system.115 The system uses an asymmetric scheme with a pair
of keys per signatory – a public key and a private key.116 The public key is the
encryption key and is shared with recipients. It is used by a recipient to validate the
signatory’s digital signature and by a sender to encrypt a transaction intended for the
key’s owner.117 In contrast, the private key is used by the signatory to generate her
digital signature for a transaction to a recipient and by a recipient to decrypt
transactions encrypted with her public key.118 Public keys are therefore shared by
parties to be trusted in a transaction and fraudulent duplication of keys is avoided
because a private key cannot be used to generate a public key and vice versa.119
Functionally, assume A and B have exchanged public keys as trusted parties to a
transaction. A uses B’s public key plus original transaction content to encrypt the
transaction to be sent to B.120 She then uses her private key plus elements of the
encrypted data to generate her digital signature to be attached to the transaction. She
then dispatches the transaction to B. B uses A’s public key to (a) verify the
authenticity of A’s digital signature and, (b) to encrypt an acknowledgment of receipt
109

Id. at 88-89.
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SCHNEIER, supra note 26, at 92-93.
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Id. at 97.
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Id. at 95.
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SCHNEIER, supra note 26, at 95.
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to be sent back to A. He then uses his private key to decrypt the transaction received
from A. It is possible that C, who is not a trusted party to the transaction, could
receive the transaction in error or by interception. But C has neither A’s nor B’s
public or private keys and therefore can neither verify A’s signature nor decrypt the
content. Also, he cannot duplicate B’s signature to create a notification of receipt in
B’s name, which A is expecting.
There are several classes of algorithms that are available for both content
encryption and digital signature generation.121 The algorithms may be proprietary,
public, or classified; they could also have different cipher strengths.122 Furthermore,
the complexity of the system poses inherent hurdles, such as determination of the
true identity of the signatory and the distribution, compatibility, and reliability of
keys.123 Since the advent of PKE, technology has attempted to create an electronic
trust infrastructure to facilitate commerce in electronic form. The most popular and
comprehensive of such efforts is the Public Key Infrastructure.
C. Creating an Infrastructure for Electronic Trust: The Public Key Infrastructure
A Public Key Infrastructure (“PKI”) is a system of key generation and
management that relies on trusted third parties to verify identity of key-owners and
signatories.124 Third-party organizations issue “certificates” to signatories that “list a
public key and confirm that the person identified in the certificate holds the
corresponding private key.”125 These organizations are known as Certificate
Authorities (“CA”).126 They also manage proper pairing of public and private keys,
verify the date and time of signatures and transactions, and maintain lists of keys that
become compromised, unreliable or otherwise invalid.127
Of course, even PKI cannot function for the purpose of standardized transactions
in healthcare, or elsewhere, if the keys managed are not themselves standardized.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) has made the most notable attempt to
create a standard for PKI keys.128 The PKIX Working Group of the IETF was
121

Id. at 89-93.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 96. See also Reed, supra note 22, at 95-97.

124

See Rebecca Porter, Do Electronic Signatures Mean An End To The Dotted Line?, 39SEP TRIAL 52, 56 (2003).
125
See Sun Microsystems, Inc. X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
(Sun Microsystems 2001), [hereinafter X.509 Certificates], at http://java.sun.com/
products/jdk/ 1.2/docs/guide/security/cert3.html (describing a Certificate as a “digitally signed
statement from one entity, saying that the public key (and some other information) of another
entity has some specific value”).
126

Porter, supra note 124.

127

Id.

128

See Overview of the IETF, at http://www.ietf.org/overview.html. The website describes
IETF as “a large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and
researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation
of the Internet. It is open to any interested individual.” It goes on to state that the individual
working groups do the technical work. These groups are organized by topic into areas such as
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established in 1995 to develop Internet standards to extend the X.509 key-certificate
standard to support PKI.129 The group’s proposals created an extensive set of
standards for various aspects of X.509 certificate management, distribution,
revocation and properties, some of which are based on existing technology.130 Most
significantly, the proposed standard provides the first realistic chance of a functional
PKI where key compatibility is not an impediment. Additionally, it also allows
special attributes certificates to store biometric templates as a part of the
authentication key.131 Finally, in addition to third party CAs, products from key
identity management vendors allow any organization to act as its own CA.132 Both
PKI, as well as these products, represent major industry acceptance of the current
version of the X.509 standard.133
There is however a gap that remains between the available technology and the
acceptability of the standard. Since the X.509 proposal is largely a recommendation,
there has been general reluctance to an industry wide adaptation. The lack of a clear
legal mandate for a standardization of this important transactional element remains
the main contention that continues to thwart portability of electronic signatures.
D. Authenticating the Signatory’s Identity: Non-Repudiation
A signatory authentication system could be single factor system such as a
password.134 However, the traditional password-only systems are plagued with
security problems that increase the risk of fraud: keystroke monitoring (a Trojan
program that stealthily monitors keystrokes to collect passwords), social engineering
(obtaining passwords using social situational tactics or spying), man-in-the-middle
attacks (computers pretending to be the service that a client signatory is trying to
reach, accepting the client’s password and other identity information, and then using
the supplied identity to authenticate on to the real service), network monitoring
(sniffing for passwords being transmitted on an entire data network), password

routing, transport, and security.
An Internet Architecture Board (“IAB”) provides
architectural oversight and adjudicates appeals on complaints.
129

See IETF, Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix) (2003), [hereinafter IETF PKIX], at
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html; see also X.509 Certificates, supra note
125 (What’s Inside an X.509 Certificate?).
130

See IETF PKIX, supra note 129.

131

See Proposed Methods to use X.509 Attribute Certificates to store biometric templates,
hereinafter X.509 Attribute Certificates, THE BIOMETRIC CONSORTIUM, at http://www.
biometrics.org/html/x.509.html.
132
See e.g. RSA Keon® Certificate Authority, RSA SECURITY, INC. (2003), at
http://www.rsasecurity.com/products/keon/certificateauth.html.
133

See RSA Keon® Certificate Authority: Technical Specifications, Certificate Standards,
RSA SECURITY, INC. (2003), available at http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1226.
134
In any authentication system, the “factor” refers to that quality of the identification
process that is unique to the user. In its simplest form, a unique factor would be something
that, presumably, only the signatory knows – a secret code or password.
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cracking (the “brute force” approach), key-under-the-mat problems (passwords
written on Post-It™ notes), and so on.135
There are modern, and stronger, single factor systems that use biometric
techniques. Biometric authentication automatically recognizes persons based on
some physiological or behavioral characteristics that are universal, distinct,
permanent, and collectible.136 These characteristics include fingerprint, face, hand
geometry, iris, and voice.137 However, these techniques suffer from certain
drawbacks such as false rejection errors, sensitivity to the environment, usersqueamishness or inconvenience, and cost.138 Additionally, in healthcare, while
biometric methods are used for workforce authentication, they may be unsuitable for
patients where a health or physiological condition could itself compromise the
efficacy of a chosen biometric characteristic.139 Biometrics is nevertheless a viable
option because characteristics that are inherent to a person are both unique and
generally available.140
An enhancement to the single-factor system is to use a two-factor system which
authenticates a signatory using two distinctive factors – something she has and
135

See Rainbow Technologies, Inc., Two-Factor Authentication – Making Sense of all the
Options, ITSECURITY.COM: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SECURITY (Townsend &
Taphouse Feb. 12 (2002), [hereinafter Rainbow Two-Factor], at http://www.itsecurity.com/
papers/rainbow2.htm.
136

S. Prabhakar et al., Biometric Recognition: Security & Privacy Concerns, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY MAGAZINE, VOL. 1, NO. 2 33 (Mar.-Apr. 2003), also available at
http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/j2033.pdf.
137

Id. at 36.

138

Id. at 35-36.

139

For instance, an iris-scan on a patient with an eye-infection. See Ultra-Scan’s Livescan
Ultrasonic Identification System Achieves Extremely High Results in Independent Lab Tests,
FINDBIOMETRICS.COM (published by TopickZ Inc.), Jan. 23, 2003, at ¶7, at
http://www.findbiometrics.com/Pages/news_releases/news295.html, [hereinafter Ultra-Scan]
(stating that conventional optical finger printing technology can “fail to read and enroll
significant portions of the population, for example, older people, people with dry skin, people
with petite fingers or fine ridge structures, often Asian women and children, and some people
with dark skin”). See also Vance C. Bjorn, An Introduction To Privacy And Security
Considerations of Biometrics Technology, 701 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 105, 107 (2002) (stating
that biometrics have “long been used in law enforcement and government applications,” and
enumerating applications in access control). But see also David A. Petti, An Argument for the
Implementation of a Biometric Authentication System (“BAS”), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 703, 703 (1998) (indicating that “widespread regulation of biometrics remains
uncharted territory in the legal framework of the United States”).
140

See discussion in supra section IV.A (comparing the biometric qualities of a handwritten
signature which is unique to the signatory and generally available, with algorithmic techniques
such as the Schnorr method, which is patented and not generally available). See also Edward
P. Richards, Phenotype v. Genotype: Why Identical Twins Have Different Fingerprints, in
Identification Evidence at ¶1 (Forensic-Evidence.com 2004), available at
http://www.forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID_Twins.html (illustrating why fingerprints may
be key evidentiary distinction between identical twins who are genetically virtually
indistinguishable).
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something she knows - thereby reducing the risk of fraud.141 The second factor
continues to be the same as single-factor systems; for example, it can be a code or
password. The first factor is typically a physical possession such as a key, a card, a
token, and so on. The reduced risk of fraud reduces the need for a biometric factor
and avoids the associated problems.142 Two-factor systems themselves come in
several flavors including code generation tokens, smart cards, and smart tokens.143
These devices have varying degrees of reliability and security, but they are
susceptible to loss, destruction and malfunction.144
VI. REGULATORY EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION
Section V.A introduced some statutory and regulatory schemes for electronic
signatures. It also pointed out that these constructions were not specific with regards
to the technology behind the signature. One might draw an analogy with the United
States Postal Services and other carrier systems such as UPS and FedEx. We rarely
wonder why in spite of these being different carrier systems the general delivery of
letters, parcels, etc. does not run into the types of problems encountered by electronic
transactions. More specifically, while a pathology specimen gets efficiently
delivered from a clinic to a laboratory by the local courier who obtains a delivery
signature on paper, the electronic transaction involved in sending the pathology
report digitally from the laboratory to the clinic runs amuck with difficulties of
identification, authentication, privacy, and electronic signatures. It would seem that
regulatory schemes that impose electronic transaction standards without delineating
any technology can complicate rather than facilitate the portability of transactions.
A. Electronic Signatures in State Statutes
Most states have enacted the UETA.145 Additionally a few states have enacted
electronic signature laws specifically for healthcare.146 There are two categories of
141

See Rainbow Two-Factor, supra note 135. The author illustrates a common example of
an automated teller machine (ATM) card and a personal identification number (PIN).
Together, they represent a form of two-factor authentication. Individually each is useless to a
prospective identity thief. Only when used together can an identity be confirmed and access
granted.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1633.2 (West 2003); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2471.3-102 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-267 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6
§ 12A-102 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4901 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 668.002 (West
2003); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/5-130 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW,
§ 21-101 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.832 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 12A:12-2 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1306.01 (West 2004); TEX. BUS. & COMM.
CODE ANN. § 43.001 (Vernon 2004).
146
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123149 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-25a (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-964 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01.2 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75
(West 2004).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

116

[Vol. 18:95

problems that persist in such statutory schemes. First, the UETA, although
consistent in terminology, is not sufficiently specific in requirements.147 Neither is it
clear on methods of implementation to be followed. For instance, section 9 of the
UETA states:
(a) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person
if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any
manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure
applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or
electronic signature was attributable.
(b) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a
person under subsection (a) is determined from the context and
surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or
adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and otherwise as
provided by law. 148 (emphasis added)
Particularly in the area of requirements, this definition creates an obstacle for the
enacted law to be useful as a standard. “Surrounding circumstances” is not defined.
Nor is there specification of what elements of the circumstances can be considered as
representing “agreement.”149 The UETA’s definition of “security procedure” also
poses similar problems:
[A] procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an electronic
signature, record, or performance is that of a specific person or for
detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. The
term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other
codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other
acknowledgment procedures. 150 (emphasis added)
Here, the phrase “is that of a specific person” in itself embodies a wide range of
methods to authenticate persons.151
To further complicate matters, healthcare-specific electronic signature statutes
vary in both specificity and consistency.152 They also suffer from lack of clarity. For
example, the term “two-level access control” under the Ohio law is ambiguous under
industry terminology.153 It could mean a two-factor system described previously.154
147

See, e.g., UETA §§ 2(8), 2(10), 2(14), 2(16), at 4-5.

148

§ 9(b).

149

Id.

150

§ 2(14).

151

See supra section V.D.

152

Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123149(g) (requiring signatory
authentication by “electronic signature keys”) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75(B)(2)
(requiring authentication by a “biometric or two-level access control”).
153

See § 3701.75(B)(2).

154

See supra section V.D.
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But it could also refer to two sets of credentials in a credential hierarchy system.155
In such a system, the signatory’s access to the electronic signature system itself
would be conditioned on her credentials existing at two different logical levels in a
multi-level hierarchy.156 However, the focus of the latter approach has more to do
with managing access control (what systems and functions a person has access to),
rather than authentication (whether the person indeed is who she is claiming to be).
It is relevant to note that while authentication is a prerequisite for access control, the
driving factor behind authentication in this discussion is the establishment of the
signatory’s identity.
In healthcare, such inconsistencies in specifications and implementation would
prevent an electronic transaction from crossing a state border with predictable legal
effect. The PKI used in one state might incorporate keys that are not recognizable by
the PKI used in another state. There may be inconsistent distribution mechanisms of
keys. The authentication technique used or implemented in one state may not be the
same and hence not verifiable in another state. Finally, even if the information were
logically portable, the inconsistency in legal effect would throw valid consent in one
state into jeopardy in another.
B. State Agencies: The Ohio State Pharmacy Board & “Positive Identification”
In Ohio, the State Pharmacy Board (“OSPB”) is responsible for administering
and enforcing laws governing the legal distribution of drugs.157 The enforcement
role in the administration of dangerous drugs has inevitably lead OSPB to address
issues surrounding modern electronic methods of drug dispensation and
recordkeeping. OPSB’s recent rules under the Ohio Administrative Code specify
minimum requirements that must be met before a computerized alternative to the
traditional paper systems can be used for pharmacy purposes, including data content,
refill history, validation, print capabilities, and association of each prescription with
relevant patient profiles.158 Specifically, OSPB’s rules focus on three inter-related
areas of electronic transactions that are functionally analogous to an electronic
signature – authentication, standardization and integrity.159
First, with respect to authentication, the rules mandate the requirement of
“positive identification” (“PID”) of individuals in all electronic pharmacy systems.160
PID is defined as:

155
See Elisa Bertino, Maχ: An Access Control System for Digital Libraries and the Web,
PROC. OF THE 26TH INT’L COMP. SOFTWARE AND APPLICATIONS CONF. 945, 947 (IEEE 2002),
at http://semioweb.msh-paris.fr/euforbia/download/max.pdf.
156

Id.

157

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4729.25, 4729.26 (West 2004); see generally OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 4729 (2003).
158

See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-28 (2004).

159

General information about OSPB can be found at http://pharmacy.ohio.gov/.

160

OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-01(N).
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[A] method of identifying an individual who prescribes, administers, or
dispenses a dangerous drug. Such method must include a physical means
of identification such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) A manual signature on a hard-copy record;
(2) A magnetic card reader;
(3) A bar code reader;
(4) A thumbprint reader or other biometric method; or
(5) A daily printout of every transaction that is verified and manually
signed within twenty-four hours by the individual who prescribed,
administered, or dispensed the dangerous drug. The printout must be
maintained for three years and made available on request to those
individuals authorized by law to review such records.
A magnetic card reader or a bar code reader system of identification must
also include a private personal identifier, such as a password, for entry
into a mechanical or automated system.161
The definition incorporates both technical and procedural specifications for an
authentication mechanism applicable to electronic signatures. For the purpose of this
discussion PID appears to be a fairly comprehensive definition for a number of
reasons. It statutorily incorporates the transition between the written and electronic
signatures.162 It also incorporates an enumerated version of the authentication
provisions of the Ohio Revised Code §3701.75(B)(2), discussed in section V.A.163
Finally, it addresses the security concerns of electronic systems, discussed in section
IV.B, by incorporating procedural controls for record of authorization of transactions
in each 24-hour period, and maintenance of these records for review.164
Second, in the area of standardization OSPB acknowledges the variety of
methods available for transmission of electronic prescriptions – “[s]ome of the
systems are office-based, some are web-based, and some use a switching station to
route the prescription to the pharmacy directly from [a prescriber’s] computer to a
pharmacy computer or facsimile machine.”165 To ensure compliance, OSPB requires
161

Id.

162

Id. at (1).

163
The provision of “two-level access control” under §3701.75(B)(2) is incorporated by
combining § 5-01(N)(2) or § 5-01(N)(3) at ¶1, with ¶2.
164
165

§ 4729-5-01(N)(5).

See Electronic Prescription Transmission Systems, [hereinafter EPTS], State Board of
Pharmacy (Feb. 4, 2004), at http://pharmacy.ohio.gov/ElectronicRx-040204.htm (describing
electronic prescription systems as those that allow prescriptions to be sent electronically from
a prescriber to a pharmacy).
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that electronic prescription systems intended for use in Ohio must obtain prior
approval from OSPB.166 The approval includes a review of each system to ensure
that “true [PID] of the prescriber sending the prescription” has been achieved under
the statute.167
Finally, with respect to integrity of the PID, OSPB notes that a mere pictographic
representation of a signature visible on a printed version of the transmission does not
meet PID requirements.168 Instead the procedural verification requirement, aimed at
non-repudiation of the transaction signatory, uses a written signature on a daily
printout of signed actions.169 However, this unfortunate reliance on printed output in
the standard hinders portability for the purpose of electronic signatures. The
validation is only available to the sender and not the recipient of the transaction. The
result yields a transaction of reduced trust because a key assurance with respect to
the trust – the authentication and integrity of the signature – does not electronically
travel with the transaction. Indeed, the lack of portability and, the concomitant lack
of trust in the transaction, are evident in certain aspects of OSPB’s use of electronic
prescription systems.170
Two further observations can be made about the PID approach in the context of
electronic signatures. First, the approach is novel as compared to existing electronic
signature systems. Not only does it explicitly disavow pictographic representations
of signatures standing alone, but it also obviates the requirement for a structural
definition of an electronic signature altogether.171 Instead PID puts its emphasis on
the signatory rather than the signature by requiring that PID be demonstrated at each
point where a signatory performs an act of professional responsibility in various
pharmacy transactions.172 In doing so, the definition incorporates the signatory’s
identity, authentication, consent, and intent into each transaction that requires some
accountability.
This implementation has the benefit of being usable in a complex, multi-user
environment where a single computer terminal may be used by multiple people in a
short time frame. This is the closest and most realistic electronic analogy to a paper
166

Id. at ¶2.

167

Id.

168

See id. at ¶3. Item (4) of the paragraph states:
[An observer], may or may not, see a signature on a prescription sent to a pharmacy by
a prescriber using an electronic prescription transmission system. Electronic
signatures are not recognized as a means of ‘positive identification’ and therefore are
not required. If a signature is present, the prescription must indicate that the signature
was computer-generated.
169

See § 4729-5-01(N)(5).

170
See EPTS, supra note 165. Item 1 under ¶3 states prohibits the use of electronic
prescriptions for Schedule II controlled substances. Also, only a few systems have been
approved under this process, as listed in ¶4.
171
Compare OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-01(N) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.75(A)(2) discussed in supra section V.A.
172

See § 4729-5-28(A)(9), § 4729-5-28(B)(5), § 4729-5-28(C)(1), § 4729-5-28(E)(3),
§ 4729-5-28(I)(10).
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signature, where a signatory can affix her signature or initials where and when
necessary, on a single document regardless of its physical custodian. Likewise here,
each signatory, whose PID contains the four essential elements of an electronic
signature discussed in section V, can electronically sign at various points within a
computer session, independent of the owner logged on to the terminal.
Second, the novelty of the approach is ironically its own barrier to portability as
compared to PKI. Notably, Ohio is the only state where a state agency has
promulgated such a standard.173 Electronic pharmacy transactions from all other
states will therefore not meet the requirements of this law and will have to revert to
traditional paper processes. Even if the implementation is adopted by other states,
there remains the technical challenge of integrating this scheme with more
conventional electronic signature approach in current systems which uses separate
logical points for authentication (at the beginning of a session, logon, and so on) and
the signature (at the time of action by a signatory, the click of a mouse, a key, and so
on). This latter approach fundamentally relies on some a method to identify the
signatory (authentication), and separate, logical and structured information to attach
to the transaction (electronic signature).
The conventional approach which has been varyingly embraced is neither easy
nor efficient to discard. However, for compliance with OSPB’s provisions, existing
systems may need only minor modifications to introduce the element of
authentication at various action points. It can therefore be argued that a structural
definition of an electronic signature, although not required, is nonetheless not
prohibited by OSPB. It can be further argued that the act of placing a signature on a
transaction can be documented by the use of a structurally defined signature, since
the latter can be attached to the transaction itself. It would therefore supplement the
need for using the paper recording of all PIDs used for validation in the OSPB
approach.174
Ultimately, to ensure use of electronic signatures across the
conventional systems, while accommodating OPSB’s PID requirements, a definition
of a structural electronic signature should be retained in any proposed standard.
C. Federal Regulations, Federal Information Policy, & Federal Agency Efforts
At the federal level, in addition to the Federal E-Sign Law, there are other
instances of regulation and agency practice that have attempted to create electronic
signature standards. While these are somewhat fragmented, they nevertheless shed
some light on current thoughts on future national technology policy with respect to
electronic signatures in healthcare and other areas of commerce.
The Federal Paperwork Reduction Act was enacted in 1995.175 The Federal
Information Policy was accordingly revised to include aspects of electronic data

173
See, e.g., Analysis of State Pharmacy Regulations Regarding ADS, Attachment 1: Stateby-State Overview of Automated Dispensing at 23, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CONSULTANT
PHARMACISTS (2001), at http://www.ascp.com/public/ga/2001/pdfs/st_auto.pdf. The authors
compile lists of states with respect to Automated Dispensing System (ADS) laws. Ohio is the
only state that requires PID.
174

See § 4729-5-01(N)(5).

175

See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.A § 101 (West 2004).
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management.176 Indirectly the act favors PKI as the standard for electronic
signatures by stipulating appropriation of necessary funding to the General Services
Administration office to “ensure the development and operation of a Federal bridge
certification authority for digital signature compatibility, and for other activities
consistent with this section . . . .”177 (emphasis added)
Similar trends are also evident in the policies of the department of Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”).178 Following the Federal E-Sign Law stipulations, the
FDA defines the electronic signature generally as “a computer data compilation of
any symbol or series of symbols executed, adopted, or authorized by an individual to
be the legally binding equivalent of the individual's handwritten signature.”179 This
regulation also goes into significant details of implementation: it inherently favors
biometric methods of authentication, and explicitly allows two-factor systems in the
alternative;180 it requires that components include identity, consent, and intent;181 it
also requires use of encryption and signature standards to ensure the integrity and
security of the signature in both open and closed systems.182
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has also been
involved in the standardization efforts for electronic signatures.183 Recently the
NIST claims to have taken “a leadership role in the development of a Federal Public
Key Infrastructure that supports digital signatures and other public key-enabled
security services” by “coordinating with industry and technical groups developing
PKI technology to foster interoperability of PKI products and projects” through the
NIST Computer Security Resource Center (“CSRC”).184 Specifically, CSRC has
created a Digital Signature Guidance document for a PKI for use by federal
agencies.185 Strongly emphasizing broad use of PKI, the guidance indicates that “the
same PKI over time will serve increasingly large numbers of customers, with
capabilities such as encryption. Consequently, up-front development costs of the
PKI may be evaluated as something to be incurred over time (like maintenance costs)
and in the context of a total service delivery program.”186
176

See Purposes, 44 U.S.C.A § 3501.

177

§ 3501.203(d).

178

See Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures, 21 C.F.R § 11 (West 2004).

179

§ 11.3(b)(7).

180

§ 11.200(a).

181

§ 11.50(b).

182

§§ 11.10, 11.30.

183

See NIST's Role in Electronic Commerce, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS
TECHNOLOGY (2000), at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/ecommerce.htm.

AND

184

See NIST PKI Program, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY CSRC
(2001), at http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/.
185
Kathy Lyons-Burke, NIST Special Publication 800-25: Federal Agency Use of Public
Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY CSRC (2001).
186

Id. at 22.
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Other departments of the United States government have also released similar
documents following the NIST guidelines.187 But whereas the NIST initiative has
significantly aided broad use of electronic signature standards in the federal
agencies, its scope is limited to those agencies that have adopted such operational
practices. They do not extend to the operations of non-federal entities and certainly
do not enter state jurisdictions. Neither do they apply to the context of healthcare
which can comprise of both governmental and private entities.
VII. NON-REGULATORY EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION
Aside from federal and state policy goals, there are other significant nonregulatory reasons why electronic signatures in healthcare need standardization.
Outside the area of rules and regulations there have been other initiatives both in
healthcare and elsewhere, that at their core depend on the portability of authorized
transactions. These activities range from national efforts by federal agencies and
committees, state health oversight boards, and the private sector.188 Without a
portable standard for electronic signatures these activities and initiatives continue to
face an uncertain legal future.
A. The US Dept. of Health And Human Services: The National Health
Information Infrastructure (NHII) Initiative
According to HHS, NHII is “the set of technologies, standards, applications,
systems, values, and laws that support all facets of individual health, health care, and
public health.”189 It is therefore:
 an initiative set forth to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and
overall quality of health and health care in the United States
 a comprehensive knowledge-based network of interoperable systems
of clinical, public health, and personal health information that would
improve decision-making by making health information available when
and where it is needed
 the set of technologies, standards, applications, systems, values, and
laws that support all facets of individual health, health care, and public
health


voluntary

187

See NIST PKI Program, supra note 184 (citing similar documents from The National
Archives and Records Administration, the Department of Treasury and the Department of
Justice).
188

This note will focus on federal efforts to highlight healthcare transactions that cross
state boundaries, which is where the portability of signature standards becomes particularly
relevant.
189

See FAQs about NHII: What is NHII?, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS., (2001),
at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/FAQ.html#What.
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 NOT a centralized database of medical records or a government
regulation.190
More specifically, it cites lack of standards as one of four barriers to the
infrastructure.191 HHS also acknowledges the importance of its role in national effort
“in helping to adopt standards for communication and interoperability between
systems.”192
In an interim report, the NHII workgroup of the National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics (“NCVHS”) emphasized the importance of standards and
interoperability as follows:
If information in multiple locations is to be searched, shared, and
synthesized when needed, we will need agreed-upon . . . gate-keeping
systems…. We will also need reliable and valid data collection methods;
common vocabularies for personal, clinical and public health information;
compatible systems to manage, transmit and protect the confidentiality of
information; and standards for interoperability.193 (emphasis added)
Of course, for the reasons discussed in section III, interoperability and transmission
of confidential and individually identifiable health information will be obstructed if
the consents and authorizations to such use, and the attendant disclosures, are not
standardized and understood by the various systems involved in the transaction.
The gateway systems referred to in the report would be unable to process
interstate healthcare transactions as envisioned by the NHII.194 Assume that a patient
who ordinarily lives and receives health care in Atlanta, Georgia and who is
diagnosed with cardiac myopathy is flown in to Cleveland, Ohio, for a hearttransplant. Further assume that the patient has electronically signed appropriate
informed consent and waiver documents. Finally, assume also that the donor is a
deceased patient from Louisville, Kentucky, whose family or estate has provided
similar consent to his primary care provider in accordance with provisions of his
will. Both sets of consents, along with pertinent clinical and medical history of both
patient and donor would have to electronically arrive at Cleveland prior to the
surgery, and distributed to all the relevant hospital staff and only the relevant staff.195

190

Id.

191

Id. at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/FAQ.html#Barriers.

192

Id. at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/FAQ.html#HHS. See generally A Strategy For
Building The National Health Information Infrastructure, Report and Recommendations From
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics Washington, D.C. (November 15,
2001), [hereinafter NHII Strategy], at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/reptrecs.htm.
193

See Interim Report: Toward a National Health Information Infrastructure § 2, NATIONAL
COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/
NHII2kReport.htm. (2000).
194
195

See id. § 5, at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/NHII2kReport.htm#infrastructure.

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d) (stipulating minimum necessary disclosure of
protected health information).
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The availability of the transactions involved here are not the technological
challenge. However, the transactions could not be meaningfully utilized if they were
not transmitted with reliable and interoperable indications of the patient’s identity,
intent, and consent.196 Additionally, there would have to be utmost assurance that (a)
the transacting hospital entities were indeed who they are, and (b) that the
information whose accuracy is critical to the life of the patient, had not been
tampered with or altered, either inadvertently or intentionally, during transit.
Finally, the technology implemented for such assurances of authentication and
integration would have to be understood by the disparate systems at the various
facilities in three states. This is only possible if the systems followed a single
standard.
B. Recommendations of the NCVHS: The Need for a Federally Mandated Electronic
Signature Standard in National Healthcare
In its report, the NCVHS also lists the perceived obstacles between the current
state of affairs and the desired future.197 They include consumer and industry
attitudes and practices in healthcare:
Health care professionals will need to reach consensus on and accept the
contribution of practice guidelines and other knowledge management
tools. Public health will need to include in its toolkit integrated data
systems; high-quality community-level data; tools to identify significant
health trends in real-time data streams; and geographic information
systems. Consumers and patients must have confidence the NHII will
deliver real benefits. They will need to feel comfortable that an
appropriate balance is being struck between their desire to safeguard
personal health information and health professionals' need for depersonalized information to protect public health, conduct medical
research, and improve health care quality.198 (emphasis added)
The “toolkits” can only be developed if the efforts are based on a standard in which
the public can have some confidence. This, perhaps more than any other element of
healthcare practice, supports the need for a federally regulated and mandated
standard as proposed here.
There are a few lessons to be learned from the promulgation of the
Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA.199 A study in the 1980s on
costs in healthcare found that a staggering proportion of federal dollars spent on
healthcare was expended in recovering the cost of healthcare itself.200 It was
estimated that “almost one-fourth of total health care spending [in 1987]” was

196

See id. § 2, at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/NHII2kReport.htm#stands.

197

Id.

198

See id. § Attitudes and Practices.

199

45 C.F.R §§ 160, 162 (West 2004).

200

See Goodman, John C. and Musgrave, Gerald L., Patient Power (Cato Institute,
Washington, D.C. 1992), excerpt at http://www.ncpa.org/w/w53.html.
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expended in administrative costs.201 The study attributed this cost to hospitals
spending an enormous amount of time on paperwork for both financial exchange and
determination of proper and necessary care.202 In November 1991, Secretary of
HHS, Dr. Louis Sullivan, convened a forum of national health care leaders to discuss
the challenges of reducing administrative costs; the forum subsequently formed a
voluntary, public-private task force called the Workgroup for Electronic Data
Interchange (“WEDI”).203
The findings of WEDI were less than flattering. According to WEDI,
improvement to healthcare costs could be realized only if the healthcare industry
adopted the X12 EDI transactions.204 It also recommended that the requirements be
federally mandated.205 Based on their recommendations the original EDI provisions
of HIPAA Administrative Simplification were drafted. Although the final rules
include privacy and security provisions for health information,206 the very existence
of these recommendations and ensuing regulations reflect, and even suggest, the
health industry’s reticence to technical self-regulation or standardization.207
C. The Private Sector: Federated Identity Management
Previous sections have highlighted access control and signatory authentication
for electronic signatures.208 The absence of consistent standards for authentication
has led to certain private sector initiatives, the most recent (and perhaps the most
prominent) of which is federated identity (“FID”) management.209 David F. Carr
describes FID as a form personal of identification; individuals can use the same FID
to sign on to different systems belonging to multiple enterprises to conduct
transactions.210 Although similar to PKI certificates, FIDs are unique because they
use a cooperative system of trust where partners offer FIDs to their clients and
customers, “depend on each other to authenticate their respective users,” and “vouch
for their access to services.”211 (emphasis added) This would allow a physician with
201

Id.

202

Id.

203

See Executive Summary, The 1993 WEDI Report § i (October 1993). WEDI is located
at http://www.wedi.org. The full report, [hereinafter WEDI Report], is located at
http://www.wedi.org/public/articles/full1993report.doc.
204

Id.

205

Id. at 1-1. Appendix 1: Standards Implementation and Uniform Data Content at ¶1
makes the following recommendation: “Mandate, by federal law, that all health care
participants use ASC X12 standards.”
206

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (West 2004).

207

See WEDI Report, supra note 203 at § ii (Executive Summary).

208

See supra sections IV.B, at 11; V.D, at 18.

209

See David F. Carr, Primer: Federated Identity Management, BASELINE, November 3,
2003, at http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,3959,1373941,00.asp.
210

Id.
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Id.
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a FID from her own facility, who refers a patient to another facility, to update an
internal record of on the latter facility's data network, while using her own facility
issued FID. To enable this, the two facilities would have to be trusted and
cooperative partners in a FID agreement.
Companies internally use various protocols to recognize their users’ identities.
Maintaining the identities of all employees of all partners in the various systems
would be a prohibitively cumbersome task. To overcome this, FIDs utilize
communications protocols such as the Security Assertion Markup Language
(“SAML”) to share information contained in FIDs, across computerized applications
and systems. Hence, a company keeps only its own directories and FIDs; it securely
exchanges FID information from it with those of its partners and vice versa without
needing to adopt the same technologies for the disparate authentication services of its
partners.212 The principle proponents of the emerging SAML standard are the
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (“OASIS”)
and the Liberty Alliance Project (“Liberty”).213 Liberty, an industry group formed
under the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) to promote FID
standards, adopted SAML version 1.1 as part of its application framework.214 Early
adopters of FID include American Express, Boeing, General Motors and Nokia.215
FID management is an attractive alternative to managed PKI, but the case studies of
the early adopters highlight the challenges that would face healthcare were it to
become an adopter to the standard.216 These challenges are both logistic as well as
legal.
Logistically, a single healthcare system can provide multiple types of specialized
care at multiple locations.217 In a 2001 article, Nicholas P. Terry notes that “a
patient's [health information] likely will be spread across many systems and various
[computerized patient records (“CPRs”)].” Referring to CPRs as the location for
maintaining longitudinal health records to improve healthcare quality, Terry notes
that “some of a patient's medical records will be in discrete unregulated systems,” so
that his discussion uses the “somewhat inaccurate singular form for CPR, including

212

Id.

213

OASIS is located at http://www.oasis-open.org/home/index.php; Liberty is located at
http://www.projectliberty.org/.
214

See David F. Carr, supra note 209. For a layout of Liberty’s proposed specifications
using this standard, see Liberty Alliance Project Phase 2 Specifications (The Liberty Alliance
2003), at http://www.projectliberty.org/specs/index.html.
215

Id.
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For an excellent overview of case studies of the early adopters of FID see Dan Blum,
Federated Identity: Early Adopters Case Studies and Lessons Learned at 10 (The Burton
Group, September 2, 2003), at http://www.burtongroup.com/guests/content/report/liberty
alliance1.asp (website requires free registration to access this complementary content; also on
file with the Journal of Law & Health).
217
See, e.g., The MetroHealth System located at http://www.metrohealth.org. The system
directory page, located at http://www.metrohealth.org/general/directory/directory.asp, lists
various types of services provided.
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within that concept multiple, but interoperable and interlinked CPRs.”218 (emphasis
added) The challenge exists because realization of the goals of FID would initially
require standardizing authentication and access control in various systems within a
healthcare organization in compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule.219 Even
beyond this, maintenance of uniform longitudinal health records in disparate systems
would be difficult at best if such maintenance were dependant on cooperative
technology efforts and resources of diverse participants ranging from single
practitioner offices to a large multi-site healthcare systems and insurance companies.
HIPAA itself acknowledges these variations in both statutory definitions as well as
comments in the preamble.220
Legally, FID’s requirement of trusted partners may raise concerns of liability and
indemnity. Analyst Carol Coye Benson points out that the liability has to do with the
quality of the identity itself.221 In essence, because one healthcare organization
would have to trust FIDs provided by another, the liability would arise from doubts
regarding the integrity of and the ability to repudiate the identity information. This
trust is relevant in the context of our discussion of signatory authentication in section
V.D.222 Assume that hospital A grants its employees FIDs and each FID contains the
birth date and social security number for verification. This practice may be
unacceptable to insurance company B whose FIDs additionally record the signatory’s
telephone number, mother’s maiden name, and city of birth. B might argue that its
practice yields higher quality FIDs (i.e. less susceptible to fraudulent use). B may
well require A, to either implement stronger FIDs or indemnify B from any harm
resulting from fraudulent use of A’s FIDs. Although Benson’s ultimate conclusion
that “large-scale identity federations will all operate with explicit disavowals of
liability” is perhaps somewhat unrealistic, it nevertheless identifies the problem.223 It
would appear that there is no legal standard or precedent addressing the quality of
the FID. Furthermore, in a cooperative environment the formulation of a standard
would be extremely difficult given the individual investments made by various
healthcare institutions in their diverse authentication systems.
Ultimately, the establishment of any standard to ensure quality authentication is
likely to fall on third party professional identity providers such as CAs.224 Many
CAs currently provide some assumptions of liability with regards to the use of their
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PKI certificates.225 In healthcare, under the HIPAA Security Rule, liability
protection and indemnification language may be considered a statutory requirement
in agreements with business associates.226 Based on these considerations, FIDs may
not provide legally reliable and predictable signatory authentication for the purpose
of electronic signatures as compared to PKI.
VIII. THE IRONY: THE REAL SCENARIO OF PORTABLE HEALTHCARE
In light of current circumstances, my imaginary encounter at UAMC system
would likely be less than the utopian picture painted in section I. Instead, I would
have to enter the hospital as an emergency department (“ED”) patient, rather than a
referral patient, since this would be the most expedient way to get care without an
appointment. Much waiting and signing of several pieces of paper would be
followed by more waiting before contact with a PSR. After all, in a trauma facility,
my influenza or even suspected pneumonia would be less critical than gunshot
wounds.
It would be almost two hours later that the PSR would have finally obtained my
relevant pharmaceutical history by interviewing me (although this information
already exists in my electronic record in Cleveland). It would be 10:00 PM before
the attending physician would finally receive a faxed copy of my records from
Cleveland, because the first transmission of my authorization would be lost in transit,
sent to a fax number incorrectly entered by an orderly in the frenzy of ED activities.
The physician would then formalize his decision to admit me for observation, with
his staff faxing off a Notice of Admission to MMO. The facility would then go
about the laborious process of preauthorizing my treatment and observation stay
through a combination of phone calls and fax transmissions. I would have signed
several more paper authorizations and disclaimers. In the flurry of papers, my copy
of the NPP would be lost.
I would finally be in my assigned bed for the night. I would be immersed in a
pamphlet with instructions about resolving billing and insurance processes awaiting
my return to Cleveland. With dawn only a few hours away, I would be oblivious to
the snow falling outside. Blow Fly would have to wait.
IX. PROPOSAL: FINAL HIPAA ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE RULES A HEALTHCARE PKI
One observation that can be made from the preceding sections is that availability
technology is not the barrier for portability of electronic signatures. If anything,
there are too many choices of technology. Neither is availability of model standards
the problem. Indeed, the main problem is the lack of a single adopted technology
standard.
A second observation is that a reasonable scheme already exists in the proposed
HIPAA electronic signature rule.227 The scheme addresses the basic requirements of
225
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integrated liability protection from Visa® and MasterCard®).
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identity, authentication, consent, integrity and security as they uniquely apply to
healthcare providers, payers and clearinghouses.228 Improving on the existing
proposed rule can thus create a workable proposal, and is arguably the most logical
approach to a national electronic signature standard for healthcare.
A. A Final Electronic Signature Rule Under HIPAA – Modifications
to the Proposed Rule
The central thrust of this proposal is to set up a trust infrastructure for E-health
under the proposed electronic signature rule of HIPAA.229 It is also recommended
that all technical specifications and standards under the rule be developed or adopted
jointly by NIST and ANSI and maintained by them as the designated standards
maintenance organizations (“DSMO”).230 To this end, the following refinements to
the existing proposed rule are added:
1. Identity
The Federal E-Sign Law is testimony to the realization that the only feasible
solution for identity management in e-commerce is a PKI. The HIPAA provisions
should accordingly incorporate this requirement in the form of a healthcare PKI.
The key or certificate management standard should follow the NIST recommended
X.509 version 3 public and private keys, further adapted to include identity roles in
healthcare transactions.231 The specifications should be adopted and maintained by
HHS as formal regulatory standards.232 Finally, a division of HHS should become
the designated CA, either directly, or through delegation to another DSMO, for all
PKI certificates assigned for healthcare operations.233
2. Authentication
Typical biometric systems used for authentication for the purpose of access
control may not be the most efficient technology for authentication of a signatory’s
identity for reasons identified earlier.234 For the typical healthcare consumer, this

228

Id.

229

Id.

230

See Health Insurance Reform: Announcement of Designated Standard Maintenance
Organizations, 65 FED. REG. 50373 (August 17, 2000), [hereinafter HIPAA DSMOs], where
pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 162.910, the Secretary of HHS has designated the following
organizations as DSMOs: Accredited Standards Committee X12; Dental Content Committee
of the American Dental Association; Health Level Seven; National Council for Prescription
Drug Programs; National Uniform Billing Committee; National Uniform Claim Committee.
231

One acting as a provider signing on a healthcare document in one transaction could
herself be a patient providing consent in a different transaction or care setting. An identity
management solution would have to accommodate these distinct roles of a single signatory in
the healthcare setting.
232

See HIPAA DSMOs, supra note 230.

233

See supra section V.C (discussing PKI and CAs).

234

See supra section V.D.

130

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 18:95

could represent unacceptable delays in healthcare should such systems malfunction.
It is useful to note that more sophisticated biometric systems are available that can
virtually eliminate false rejections.235 However commercial application of such
systems in healthcare has two drawbacks: (a) they are usually not cost-effective
solutions, and (b) they often use proprietary or patented techniques, with the
associated problems discussed in section IV.A. Accordingly, digital signature
capture solutions that capture signature metrics are favored over biometric solutions
in this proposal.236 This technique offers the benefits of biometrics while retaining a
pictographic symbol familiar in printed output. The standard should specify the
minimum metrics to be captured in digital signature capture systems to ensure
portability of authentication. Appropriate metrics templates should be incorporated
into the modified X.509 key standard for signatures thus captured.237
Two-factor authentication can also be used as an alternative method, with a
digital signature code unique to the user to be attached to each transaction.238 It is
noted that when sufficiently developed, the emerging SSL/UA standard can be
incorporated into this standard with its attendant benefits of easy distribution and low
cost.239 It is useful to reiterate that authentication here is narrowly tailored for use in
electronic signatures.240 For the purpose of general workforce access control, either
conventional biometrics or two-factor authentication remain the principal choice.
Specifically, where a member of the workforce is also a patient, the use of both
methods is not precluded in the scheme proposed here.
3. Intent And Consent
Standard consent language fields should become a part of the transaction content
for all healthcare transactions. Logical manifestation indicating intent and
understanding of the transaction content is more complex, and should be formalized
235
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in the standard as a mechanism of recording a series of actions such as key-strokes
(e.g. the Page Down key) indicating that the signatory has viewed all the appropriate
screens by paging through them before signing.
4. Integrity And Security
PKI ensures the integrity and security of transactions because it allows the
incorporation of encryption and integrity check schemes into the various stages of
the transaction creation, transmission, receipt, and acknowledgment sequence.241
The only remaining stipulation required here is the use of a standard encryption
scheme. Owing to the rapid development and improvement in encryption ciphers
and their relative strengths, this area of the standard could be stipulated as a set of
minimum requirements. However, in the interest of ensuring portability, a better
proposition would have requirements specified and adopted by the DSMOs as part of
the PKI, to be updated as needed by proposed HHS rule-making from time to time.
This will further ensure that the technical maturity of the standard remains flexible to
the underlying legislative processes.
B. Benefits of Electronic Signature Regulations Under HIPAA: The Role of the
Federal Government in Healthcare as a National Enterprise
The benefits of the proposed standard are numerous. First, the proposal calls for
a modification of existing proposed rules under HIPAA. New congressional
lawmaking will not be required; instead refinement and furtherance of existing
agency regulations will suffice. Legislative and judicial challenges of new
congressional lawmaking thus will be avoided. Additionally, HHS will have the
benefit of experience gained from the ongoing implementation of the Transactions
and Code Sets rules of HIPAA in the area of patient financial transactions.242
Second, HIPAA includes a broad grant of authority from Congress to HHS as to
the regulation of medical information:
If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information transmitted in connection with
the transactions described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act (as
added by Section 262) is not enacted by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall promulgate final regulations
containing such standards. . . . 243
HIPAA also includes provisions that address the issue of non-preemption of state
laws by clarifying that “[a] regulation promulgated under [the rule] shall not
supercede a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes
requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent
than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under the
regulation.”244 Since the UETA is modeled after the Federal E-Sign Law, and this
241
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proposal draws on the latter, non-preemption should not be a problem in states that
have only enacted the UETA. However for those states where disparate electronic
signature statutes exist specifically for healthcare, the proposed standard should
prevail; more stringent state technical standards may nevertheless be incompatible
with this standard in the realm of portability. Therefore, minimally the preemption
clause should apply to invalidate any state statute whose implementation would be
contrary to the technical standards developed under this proposal.
Third, Congress’s legislative authority under HIPAA has successfully passed
judicial scrutiny. In South Carolina Med. Ass’n v. Thompson, the appellants
challenged HIPAA on grounds of impermissible Congressional authority and sought
to have several provisions of the HIPAA declared unconstitutional.245 The fourth
circuit rejected the argument because “Congress laid out an intelligible principle in
HIPAA to guide agency action . . . .”246 The court found the promulgation of the
regulations to be “a necessary cooperation between coordinate branches” rather than
a constitutionally impermissible delegation of legislative authority.247 In particular
the court pointed out that the regulations focused on “enabling electronic portability,
not simply on regulating purely electronic activity.”248 (emphasis added)
Similarly, in Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. Of Health
and Human Services, the petitioners challenged the authority of HHS under HIPAA
claiming that it violated the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.249
However, that court also rejected the complaint because “HIPAA regulates interstate
economic activity” and “[h]ealth care providers transmitting health information in
electronic form in connection with health claims, referral authorizations, and health
care payments, also engage in interstate commerce.”250 It thus concluded that
HIPAA fell within Congress's authority under the Commerce power.251
Finally, in the NHII reality healthcare effectively ceases to be a local or state
owned process. Instead it becomes a national industry that facilitates the delivery of
healthcare seamlessly and uniformly across state borders. In this context, conflicting
standards that impede the flow of healthcare transactions across state borders would
be contrary to national healthcare policy. Indeed, one could go so far as to argue that
if NHII becomes the de facto standard for electronic healthcare, any state electronic
signature law for healthcare that contradicts the infrastructure’s intended portability
also effectively “burdens interstate migration and thus violates the [signatory’s
constitutional] right to travel.”252
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C. Implementation, Non-Compliance, and Sanctions: Some Final Thoughts
It would be prudent to note that NCVHS’s final report on the NHII253 is followed
closely in time by its formal recommendations for the Patient Medical Records
Information (“PMRI”) standards.254 Specifically, PMRI Recommendation, made
pursuant to a provision in HIPAA,255 stipulates Health Level Seven as the current
standard for clinical transactions such as order entry, scheduling, medical
record/image management, patient administration, observation reporting, financial
management, and patient care.256 This is the last significant piece of the electronic
healthcare puzzle. While the standard transaction provisions under HIPAA address
the financial and billing transactions for healthcare, PMRI Recommendations would
cover clinical transactions.257 This is arguably the best opportunity the health
industry has had to effectuate true portability of a standardized healthcare transaction
– an effort that at its forefront must include the electronic signature issues for reasons
previously discussed.
One might also note that state signature statutes rarely contain explicit sanctions
for violations; as seen earlier, disputes involving non-compliance have had to resort
to the common law.258 In contrast, HIPAA stipulates civil and monetary penalties for
violations of the HHS rules.259 Additionally, HHS can bring to bear the enormous
financial weight of the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs as healthcare payers
in order to encourage compliance. The sanction provisions, combined with this
financial clout, would make a modified final HIPAA electronic signature statute,
under the authority of HHS, the ideal approach to achieving the vision of NHII.
X. CONCLUSIONS
NHII’s vision of an integrated health information infrastructure can provide a
truly seemless healthcare environment for today’s patient. Information can freely
flow between entities across state borders. The vision is fundamentally dependant on
various functions of the traditional signature in the healthcare context. Such
functions are a product of both the common law as well as legislative efforts at state
and federal levels. To bring healthcare into the electronic information age, one must
migrate healthcare information management from paper processes to electronic
records. An integral and vital part of this migration is the formulation of an
253
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electronic signature that is uniform and portable. Portability will assure that the legal
requirements of signatures – identity, authentication, consent and intent, and integrity
and security – become a part of each healthcare transaction.
The ultimate realization of NHII will necessitate creating a healthcare PKI. A
PKI will inherently provide non-repudiated authentication of the signatory’s identity,
consent, and intent. It will also ensure integrity and security of the transaction
content through encryption. Current regulatory efforts at standardization through
state statutes, federal regulations, federal information policy, and federal and state
agency rules have produced inconsistent results. But these efforts point to the need
for a healthcare PKI. This position is also supported by non-regulatory efforts and
initiatives both at the federal level as well as in the private sector. The absence of a
uniform standard destroys the utopia of the NHII with the frustrations of nonportability.
Accordingly, a federally mandated uniform statutory scheme would be ideal
under a final modified version of the pending HIPAA electronic signature rule. It
would create a national healthcare PKI, and address all aspects of electronic
signatures - identity, authentication, consent and intent, and integrity and security.
Such a rule would benefit from the federal government’s role in national healthcare
and its prior experience with implementation of other HIPAA provisions. The
federal government’s authority to create such rules through HHS has already been
endorsed by the judiciary. Finally, the civil and monetary penalties of noncompliance under HIPAA, as well as HHS’s financial weight as a payer in the
healthcare industry, would ensure satisfactory compliance with the rule’s standards.
NHII could indeed be the reality of future national healthcare.
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